Articulo de referencia

Externality

Air pollution from motor vehicles is an example of a negative externality. The costs of the air pollution for the rest of society is not compensated for by either the producers ...

Air pollution from motor vehicles is an example of a negative externality. The costs of the air pollution for the rest of society is not compensated for by either the producers or users of motorized transport.

In economics, an externality is a cost or benefit to an uninvolved third party that arises as an effect of another party's (or parties') activity. Many externalities can be considered as unpriced components that are involved in either consumer or producer consumption. Air pollution from motor vehicles is one example. The cost of air pollution to society is not paid by either the producers or users of motorized transport. Water pollution from mills and factories are another example. All (water) consumers are made worse off by pollution but are not compensated by the market for this damage.

The concept of externality was first developed by Alfred Marshall in the 1890s[1] and achieved broader attention in the works of economist Arthur Pigou in the 1920s.[2] The prototypical example of a negative externality is environmental pollution. Pigou argued that a tax, equal to the marginal damage or marginal external cost, (later called a "Pigouvian tax") on negative externalities could be used to reduce their incidence to an efficient level.[2] Subsequent thinkers have debated whether it is preferable to tax or to regulate negative externalities,[3] the optimally efficient level of the Pigouvian taxation,[4] and what factors cause or exacerbate negative externalities, such as providing investors in corporations with limited liability for harms committed by the corporation.[5][6][7]

Externalities often occur when the production or consumption of a product or service's private price equilibrium cannot reflect the true costs or benefits of that product or service for society as a whole.[8][9] This causes the externality competitive equilibrium to not adhere to the condition of Pareto optimality. Thus, since resources can be better allocated, externalities are an example of market failure.[10]

Externalities can be either positive or negative. Governments and institutions often take actions to internalize externalities, thus market-priced transactions can incorporate all the benefits and costs associated with transactions between economic agents.[11][12] The most common way this is done is by imposing taxes on the producers of this externality. This is usually done similar to a quote where there is no tax imposed and then once the externality reaches a certain point there is a very high tax imposed. However, since regulators do not always have all the information on the externality it can be difficult to impose the right tax. Once the externality is internalized through imposing a tax the competitive equilibrium is now Pareto optimal.

History of the concept

The term "externality" was first coined by the British economist Alfred Marshall in his seminal work, "Principles of Economics," published in 1890. Marshall introduced the concept to elucidate the effects of production and consumption activities that extend beyond the immediate parties involved in a transaction. Marshall's formulation of externalities laid the groundwork for subsequent scholarly inquiry into the broader societal impacts of economic actions. While Marshall provided the initial conceptual framework for externalities, it was Arthur Pigou, a British economist, who further developed the concept in his influential work, "The Economics of Welfare," published in 1920. Pigou expanded upon Marshall's ideas and introduced the concept of "Pigovian taxes" or corrective taxes aimed at internalizing externalities by aligning private costs with social costs. His work emphasized the role of government intervention in addressing market failures resulting from externalities.[1]

Additionally, the American economist Frank Knight contributed to the understanding of externalities through his writings on social costs and benefits in the 1920s and 1930s. Knight's work highlighted the inherent challenges in quantifying and mitigating externalities within market systems, underscoring the complexities involved in achieving optimal resource allocation.[13] Throughout the 20th century, the concept of externalities continued to evolve with advancements in economic theory and empirical research. Scholars such as Ronald Coase and Harold Hotelling made significant contributions to the understanding of externalities and their implications for market efficiency and welfare.

El reconocimiento de las externalidades como un fenómeno generalizado con amplias implicaciones ha propiciado su incorporación a diversos campos más allá de la economía, como las ciencias ambientales, la salud pública y la planificación urbana. Los debates actuales sobre temas como el cambio climático , la contaminación y el agotamiento de los recursos subrayan la relevancia perdurable del concepto de externalidades para abordar los desafíos sociales más apremiantes.

Definiciones

Los vecinos que viven al lado de esta casa y jardín pueden disfrutar de la vista de las hermosas flores sin costo alguno.

Una externalidad negativa es cualquier diferencia entre el costo privado de una acción o decisión para un agente económico y el costo social. En términos sencillos, una externalidad negativa es todo aquello que genera un costo indirecto para los individuos. Un ejemplo son los gases tóxicos que se liberan de las industrias o minas; estos gases perjudican a las personas en las zonas aledañas, quienes deben asumir un costo (costo indirecto) para mitigar dicho daño. Por el contrario, una externalidad positiva es cualquier diferencia entre el beneficio privado de una acción o decisión para un agente económico y el beneficio social. Una externalidad positiva es todo aquello que genera un beneficio indirecto para los individuos y por el cual el productor de dicha externalidad positiva no recibe compensación. Por ejemplo, plantar árboles embellece las propiedades y, además, contribuye a la limpieza de las zonas circundantes.

En la teoría microeconómica, las externalidades se incorporan al análisis del equilibrio competitivo como efecto social, a diferencia del mercado privado, que solo considera los efectos económicos directos. El efecto social de la actividad económica es la suma de los factores indirectos (las externalidades) y directos. Por lo tanto, el óptimo de Pareto se encuentra en los niveles donde el beneficio marginal social es igual al costo marginal social.

Externalities are the residual effects of economic activity on persons not directly participating in the transaction. The consequences of producer or consumer behaviors that result in external costs or advantages imposed on others are not taken into account by market pricing and can have both positive and negative effects. To further elaborate on this, when expenses associated with the production or use of an item or service are incurred by others but are not accounted for in the market price, this is known as a negative externality. The health and well-being of local populations may be negatively impacted by environmental deterioration resulting from the extraction of natural resources. Comparably, the tranquility of surrounding inhabitants might be disturbed by noise pollution from industry or transit, which lowers their quality of life. On the other hand, positive externalities occur when the activities of producers or consumers benefit other parties in ways that are not accounted for in market exchanges. A prime example of a positive externality is education, as those who invest in it gain knowledge and production for society as a whole in addition to personal profit.[14]

Government involvement is frequently necessary to address externalities. This can be done by enacting laws, Pigovian taxes, or other measures that encourage positive externalities or internalize external costs. Through the integration of externalities into economic research and policy formulation, society may endeavor to get results that optimize aggregate well-being and foster sustainable growth.[14]

Implications

A voluntary exchange may reduce societal welfare if external costs exist. The person who is affected by the negative externalities in the case of air pollution will see it as lowered utility: either subjective displeasure or potentially explicit costs, such as higher medical expenses. The externality may even be seen as a trespass on their health or violating their property rights (by reduced valuation). Thus, an external cost may pose an ethical or political problem. Negative externalities are Pareto inefficient, and since Pareto efficiency underpins the justification for private property, they undermine the whole idea of a market economy. For these reasons, negative externalities are more problematic than positive externalities.[15]

Although positive externalities may appear to be beneficial, while Pareto efficient, they still represent a failure in the market as it results in the production of the good falling under what is optimal for the market. By allowing producers to recognise and attempt to control their externalities production would increase as they would have motivation to do so.[16] With this comes the free rider problem. The free rider problem arises when people overuse a shared resource without doing their part to produce or pay for it. It represents a failure in the market where goods and services are not able to be distributed efficiently, allowing people to take more than what is fair. For example, if a farmer has honeybees a positive externality of owning these bees is that they will also pollinate the surrounding plants. This farmer has a next door neighbour who also benefits from this externality even though he does not have any bees himself. From the perspective of the neighbour he has no incentive to purchase bees himself as he is already benefiting from them at zero cost. But for the farmer, he is missing out on the full benefits of his own bees which he paid for, because they are also being used by his neighbour.[17]

Graph of positive externality in production

There are a number of theoretical means of improving overall social utility when negative externalities are involved. The market-driven approach to correcting externalities is to internalize third party costs and benefits, for example, by requiring a polluter to repair any damage caused. But in many cases, internalizing costs or benefits is not feasible, especially if the true monetary values cannot be determined.

Laissez-faire economists such as Friedrich Hayek and Milton Friedman sometimes refer to externalities as "neighborhood effects" or "spillovers", although externalities are not necessarily minor or localized. Similarly, Ludwig von Mises argues that externalities arise from lack of "clear personal property definition."

Examples

Many externalities arise between producers, between consumers or between consumers and producers. Externalities can be negative when the action of one party imposes costs on another, or positive when the action of one party benefits another.

Negative

Light pollution is an example of an externality because the consumption of street lighting has an effect on bystanders that is not compensated for by the consumers of the lighting.

A negative externality (also called "external cost" or "external diseconomy") is an economic activity that imposes a negative effect on an unrelated third party, not captured by the market price. It can arise either during the production or the consumption of a good or service.[18] Pollution is termed an externality because it imposes costs on people who are "external" to the producer and consumer of the polluting product.[19]Barry Commoner commented on the costs of externalities:

Clearly, we have compiled a record of serious failures in recent technological encounters with the environment. In each case, the new technology was brought into use before the ultimate hazards were known. We have been quick to reap the benefits and slow to comprehend the costs.[20]

Many negative externalities are related to the environmental consequences of production and use. The article on environmental economics also addresses externalities and how they may be addressed in the context of environmental issues.

"The corporation is an externalizing machine (moving its operating costs and risks to external organizations and people), in the same way that a shark is a killing machine." - Robert Monks (2003) Republican candidate for Senate from Maine and corporate governance adviser in the film "The Corporation".

Negative production externalities

Effluent flows from industrial plants can pollute waterways.
Diagram of the externalities of cars and automobility and their negative impacts[21]

Examples for negative production externalities include:

  • Air pollution from burning fossil fuels. This activity causes damages to crops, materials and (historic) buildings and public health.[22][23]
  • Anthropogenic climate change as a consequence of greenhouse gas emissions from the burning of fossil fuels and the rearing of livestock. The Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change says "Climate change presents a unique challenge for economics: it is the greatest example of market failure we have ever seen."[24]
  • Water pollution from industrial effluents can harm plants, animals, and humans
  • Spam emails during the sending of unsolicited messages by email.[25]
  • Government regulation: Any costs required to comply with a law, regulation, or policy, either in terms of time or money, that are not covered by the entity issuing the edict (see also unfunded mandate).
  • Noise pollution during the production process, which may be mentally and psychologically disruptive.
  • Systemic risk: the risks to the overall economy arising from the risks that the banking system takes. A condition of moral hazard can occur in the absence of well-designed banking regulation,[26] or in the presence of badly designed regulation.[27]
  • Negative effects of Industrial farm animal production, including "the increase in the pool of antibiotic-resistant bacteria because of the overuse of antibiotics; air quality problems; the contamination of rivers, streams, and coastal waters with concentrated animal waste; animal welfare problems, mainly as a result of the extremely close quarters in which the animals are housed."[28][29]
  • The depletion of the stock of fish in the ocean due to overfishing. This is an example of a common property resource, which is vulnerable to the tragedy of the commons in the absence of appropriate environmental governance.
  • In the United States, the cost of storing nuclear waste from nuclear plants for more than 1,000 years (over 100,000 for some types of nuclear waste) is, in principle, included in the cost of the electricity the plant produces in the form of a fee paid to the government and held in the nuclear waste superfund, although much of that fund was spent on Yucca Mountain nuclear waste repository without producing a solution. Conversely, the costs of managing the long-term risks of disposal of chemicals, which may remain hazardous on similar time scales, is not commonly internalized in prices. The USEPA regulates chemicals for periods ranging from 100 years to a maximum of 10,000 years.

Negative consumption externalities

Examples of negative consumption externalities include:

Negative consumption externality
  • Noise pollution: Sleep deprivation due to a neighbor listening to loud music late at night.
  • Antibiotic resistance, caused by increased usage of antibiotics: Individuals do not consider this efficacy cost when making usage decisions. Government policies proposed to preserve future antibiotic effectiveness include educational campaigns, regulation, Pigouvian taxes, and patents.
  • Passive smoking: Shared costs of declining health and vitality caused by smoking or alcohol abuse. Here, the "cost" is that of providing minimum social welfare. Economists more frequently attribute this problem to the category of moral hazards, the prospect that parties insulated from risk may behave differently from the way they would if they were fully exposed to the risk. For example, individuals with insurance against automobile theft may be less vigilant about locking their cars, because the negative consequences of automobile theft are (partially) borne by the insurance company.
  • Traffic congestion: When more people use public roads, road users experience congestion costs such as more waiting in traffic and longer trip times. Increased road users also increase the likelihood of road accidents.[30]
  • Price increases: Consumption by one party causes prices to rise and therefore makes other consumers worse off, perhaps by preventing, reducing or delaying their consumption. These effects are sometimes called "pecuniary externalities" and are distinguished from "real externalities" or "technological externalities". Pecuniary externalities appear to be externalities, but occur within the market mechanism and are not considered to be a source of market failure or inefficiency, although they may still result in substantial harm to others.[31]
  • Weak public infrastructure, air pollution, climate change, work misallocation, resource requirements and land/space requirements as in the externalities of automobiles.[32]

Negative externalities outside production and consumption

Some negative externalities involve neither production nor consumption. One such externality is the spread of infectious diseases to others resulting from one's exercising the right to decline preventive or therapeutic medical care. A specific example is when vaccine hesitancy prevents or undoes the attainment of population immunity and thus leads to outbreaks.

Positive

A positive externality (also called "external benefit" or "external economy" or "beneficial externality") is the positive effect an activity imposes on an unrelated third party.[33] Similar to a negative externality, it can arise either on the production side, or on the consumption side.[18]

A positive production externality occurs when a firm's production increases the well-being of others but the firm is uncompensated by those others, while a positive consumption externality occurs when an individual's consumption benefits other but the individual is uncompensated by those others.[34]

Positive production externalities

Examples of positive production externalities

Beekeepers' hives of bees can help pollinate the surrounding crops, which is a positive production externality.
  • A beekeeper who keeps the bees for their honey. A side effect or externality associated with such activity is the pollination of surrounding crops by the bees. The value generated by the pollination may be more important than the value of the harvested honey.
  • The corporate development of some free software (studied notably by Jean Tirole and Steven Weber[35])
  • Research and development, since much of the economic benefits of research are not captured by the originating firm.[36]
  • An industrial company providing first aid classes for employees to increase on the job safety. This may also save lives outside the factory.
  • Restored historic buildings may encourage more people to visit the area and patronize nearby businesses.[37]
  • A foreign firm that demonstrates up-to-date technologies to local firms and improves their productivity.[38]
  • Public transport can increase economic welfare by providing transit services to other economic activities, however the benefits of those other economic activities are not felt by the operator, it can also decrease the negative externalities of increasing road patronage in the absence of a congestion charge.[39]
  • The personal cost of an education will have an external benefit to society.[40]
Positive consumption externality

Positive consumption externalities

Examples of positive consumption externalities include:

  • Una persona que mantiene una casa atractiva puede brindar beneficios a sus vecinos en forma de un aumento en el valor de mercado de sus propiedades. Este es un ejemplo de externalidad pecuniaria, ya que el efecto indirecto positivo se refleja en los precios de mercado. En este caso, los precios de las casas en el vecindario aumentarán para ajustarse al incremento del valor inmobiliario derivado del mantenimiento estético (por ejemplo, cortando el césped, manteniendo la basura ordenada y pintando la casa) [ 41 ].
  • Todo aquello que reduce la tasa de transmisión de una enfermedad infecciosa conlleva externalidades positivas. Esto incluye vacunas, cuarentena, pruebas y otros procedimientos de diagnóstico. En el caso de las infecciones transmitidas por el aire , también incluye el uso de mascarillas. Para las enfermedades transmitidas por el agua, incluye la mejora de los sistemas de alcantarillado y saneamiento. [ 42 ] (Véase inmunidad colectiva )
  • Una mayor educación de las personas puede generar beneficios sociales más amplios, como una mayor productividad económica , una menor tasa de desempleo , una mayor movilidad de los hogares y mayores tasas de participación política . [ 43 ]
  • Una persona compra un producto interconectado en una red (por ejemplo, un teléfono inteligente ). Esto aumenta la utilidad de dichos teléfonos para otras personas que poseen un teléfono móvil con video. Cuando cada nuevo usuario de un producto incrementa el valor del mismo producto que poseen otros, el fenómeno se denomina externalidad de red o efecto de red . Las externalidades de red suelen tener puntos de inflexión donde, repentinamente, el producto alcanza una aceptación general y un uso casi universal.
  • En una zona que no cuenta con un departamento de bomberos público , los propietarios que contratan servicios privados de protección contra incendios proporcionan una externalidad positiva a las propiedades vecinas, que corren menos riesgo de que el fuego del vecino protegido se propague a su casa (desprotegida).

Se implementan soluciones colectivas o políticas públicas para regular actividades con externalidades positivas o negativas.

Posicional

La base sociológica de las externalidades posicionales se fundamenta en las teorías del consumo ostentoso y los bienes posicionales . [ 44 ]

En el Derby de Kentucky , una importante competición de carreras de caballos, algunos asistentes llevan sombreros caros para ostentar su riqueza y estatus.

Conspicuous consumption (originally articulated by Veblen, 1899) refers to the consumption of goods or services primarily for the purpose of displaying social status or wealth. In simpler terms, individuals engage in conspicuous consumption to signal their economic standing or to gain social recognition.[45] Positional goods (introduced by Hirsch, 1977) are such goods, whose value is heavily contingent upon how they compare to similar goods owned by others. Their desirability is or derived utility is intrinsically tied to their relative scarcity or exclusivity within a particular social context.[46]

The economic concept of Positional externalities originates from Duesenberry's Relative Income Hypothesis. This hypothesis challenges the conventional microeconomic model, as outlined by the Common Pool Resource (CPR) mechanism, which typically assumes that an individual's utility derived from consuming a particular good or service remains unaffected by other's consumption choices. Instead, Duesenberry posits that individuals gauge the utility of their consumption based on a comparison with other consumption bundles, thus introducing the notion of relative income into economic analysis. Consequently, the consumption of positional goods becomes highly sought after, as it directly impacts one's perceived status relative to others in their social circle.[47]

Example: consider a scenario where individuals within a social group vie for the latest luxury cars. As one member acquires a top-of-the-line vehicle, others may feel compelled to upgrade their own cars to preserve their status within the group. This cycle of competitive consumption can result in inefficient allocation of resources and exacerbate income inequality within society.

The consumption of positional goods engenders negative externalities, wherein the acquisition of such goods by one individual diminishes the utility or value of similar goods held by others within the same reference group. This positional externality, can lead to a cascade of overconsumption, as individuals strive to maintain or improve their relative position through excessive spending.

Positional externalities are related, but not similar to Percuniary externalities.

Pecuniary

Pecuniary externalities are those which affect a third party's profit but not their ability to produce or consume. These externalities "occur when new purchases alter the relevant context within which an existing positional good is evaluated."[48]Robert H. Frank gives the following example:

if some job candidates begin wearing expensive custom-tailored suits, a side effect of their action is that other candidates become less likely to make favorable impressions on interviewers. From any individual job seeker's point of view, the best response might be to match the higher expenditures of others, lest her chances of landing the job fall. But this outcome may be inefficient since when all spend more, each candidate's probability of success remains unchanged. All may agree that some form of collective restraint on expenditure would be useful."[48]
A man in a suit is being interviewed by a woman.

Frank notes that treating positional externalities like other externalities might lead to "intrusive economic and social regulation."[48] He argues, however, that less intrusive and more efficient means of "limiting the costs of expenditure cascades"—i.e., the hypothesized increase in spending of middle-income families beyond their means "because of indirect effects associated with increased spending by top earners"—exist; one such method is the personal income tax.[48]

Inframarginal

The concept of inframarginal externalities was introduced by James Buchanan and Craig Stubblebine in 1962.[49] Inframarginal externalities differ from other externalities in that there is no benefit or loss to the marginal consumer. At the relevant margin to the market, the externality does not affect the consumer and does not cause a market inefficiency. The externality only affects at the inframarginal range outside where the market clears. These types of externalities do not cause inefficient allocation of resources and do not require policy action.

Technological

Technological externalities directly affect a firm's production and therefore, indirectly influence an individual's consumption; and the overall impact of society; for example Open-source software or free software development by corporations. These externalities occur when technology spillovers from the acts of one economic agent impact the production or consumption potential of another agency. Depending on their nature, these spillovers may produce positive or negative externalities. The creation of new technologies that help people in ways that go beyond the original inventor is one instance of positive technical externalities. Let us examine the instance of research and development (R&D) inside the pharmaceutical sector.

In addition to possible financial gain, a pharmaceutical company's R&D investment in the creation of a new medicine helps society in other ways. Better health outcomes, higher productivity, and lower healthcare expenses for both people and society at large might result from the new medication. Furthermore, the information created via research and development frequently spreads to other businesses and sectors, promoting additional innovation and economic expansion. For example, biotechnology advances could have uses in agriculture, environmental cleanup, or renewable energy, not just in the pharmaceutical industry.

However, technical externalities can also take the form of detrimental spillovers that cost society money. Pollution from industrial manufacturing processes is a prime example. Businesses might not be entirely responsible for the expenses of environmental deterioration if they release toxins into the air or rivers as a result of their production processes. Rather, these expenses are shifted to society in the form of decreased quality of life for impacted populations, harm to the environment, and health risks.

In addition, workers in some industries may experience job displacement and unemployment as a result of disruptive developments in labor markets brought about by technological improvements. For instance, individuals with outdated skills may lose their jobs as a result of the automation of manufacturing processes through robots and artificial intelligence, causing social and economic unrest in the affected areas.[8]

Supply and demand diagram

The usual economic analysis of externalities can be illustrated using a standard supply and demand diagram if the externality can be valued in terms of money. An extra supply or demand curve is added, as in the diagrams below. One of the curves is the private cost that consumers pay as individuals for additional quantities of the good, which in competitive markets, is the marginal private cost. The other curve is the true cost that society as a whole pays for production and consumption of increased production the good, or the marginal social cost. Similarly, there might be two curves for the demand or benefit of the good. The social demand curve would reflect the benefit to society as a whole, while the normal demand curve reflects the benefit to consumers as individuals and is reflected as effective demand in the market.

What curve is added depends on the type of externality that is described, but not whether it is positive or negative. Whenever an externality arises on the production side, there will be two supply curves (private and social cost). However, if the externality arises on the consumption side, there will be two demand curves instead (private and social benefit). This distinction is essential when it comes to resolving inefficiencies that are caused by externalities.

External costs

Demand curve with external costs; if social costs are not accounted for price is too low to cover all costs and hence quantity produced is unnecessarily high (because the producers of the good and their customers are essentially underpaying the total, real factors of production).

The graph shows the effects of a negative externality. For example, the steel industry is assumed to be selling in a competitive market – before pollution-control laws were imposed and enforced (e.g. under laissez-faire). The marginal private cost is less than the marginal social or public cost by the amount of the external cost, i.e., the cost of air pollution and water pollution. This is represented by the vertical distance between the two supply curves. It is assumed that there are no external benefits, so that social benefit equals individual benefit.

If the consumers only take into account their own private cost, they will end up at price Pp and quantity Qp, instead of the more efficient price Ps and quantity Qs. These latter reflect the idea that the marginal social benefit should equal the marginal social cost, that is that production should be increased only as long as the marginal social benefit exceeds the marginal social cost. The result is that a free market is inefficient since at the quantity Qp, the social benefit is less than the social cost, so society as a whole would be better off if the goods between Qp and Qs had not been produced. The problem is that people are buying and consuming too much steel.

Este análisis implica que las externalidades negativas (como la contaminación) son más que un simple problema ético. El problema radica en la disyuntiva entre los costos marginales privados y sociales, que no se resuelve con el libre mercado. Se trata de un problema de comunicación y coordinación social para equilibrar costos y beneficios. Esto también implica que la contaminación no se soluciona mediante mercados competitivos. Se requiere una solución colectiva , como un sistema judicial que permita compensar a las partes afectadas por la contaminación, la intervención gubernamental para prohibirla o desalentarla, o incentivos económicos como los impuestos ambientales .

Beneficios externos

Curva de oferta con beneficios externos; cuando el mercado no tiene en cuenta los beneficios sociales adicionales de un bien, tanto el precio del bien como la cantidad producida son inferiores a lo que el mercado podría soportar.

El gráfico muestra los efectos de una externalidad positiva o beneficiosa. Por ejemplo, se supone que la industria que suministra las vacunas contra la viruela opera en un mercado competitivo. El beneficio marginal privado de recibir la vacuna es menor que el beneficio marginal social o público en la cantidad del beneficio externo (por ejemplo, la sociedad en su conjunto está cada vez más protegida contra la viruela con cada vacunación, incluso quienes se niegan a participar). Este beneficio marginal externo de recibir la vacuna contra la viruela está representado por la distancia vertical entre las dos curvas de demanda. Supongamos que no existen costos externos, de modo que el costo social es igual al costo individual.

Si los consumidores solo consideran sus propios beneficios privados al vacunarse, el mercado terminará con el precio P p y la cantidad Q p como antes, en lugar del precio P s y la cantidad Q s más eficientes . Esto último refleja nuevamente la idea de que el beneficio social marginal debe ser igual al costo social marginal, es decir, que la producción debe aumentarse siempre que el beneficio social marginal supere el costo social marginal. El resultado en un mercado sin restricciones es ineficiente, ya que en la cantidad Q p , el beneficio social es mayor que el costo social, por lo que la sociedad en su conjunto estaría mejor si se produjeran más bienes. El problema es que la gente está comprando muy pocas vacunas.

La cuestión de los beneficios externos está relacionada con la de los bienes públicos , que son bienes de los que es difícil, si no imposible, excluir a las personas de los beneficios. La producción de un bien público tiene externalidades beneficiosas para toda, o casi toda, la población. Al igual que con los costes externos, aquí existe un problema de comunicación y coordinación social para equilibrar beneficios y costes. Esto también implica que la vacunación no es algo que se resuelva mediante mercados competitivos. El gobierno puede tener que intervenir con una solución colectiva, como subvencionar o exigir legalmente el uso de la vacuna. Si el gobierno hace esto, el bien se denomina bien de mérito . Ejemplos incluyen políticas para acelerar la introducción de vehículos eléctricos [ 50 ] o promover el ciclismo , [ 51 ] ambos beneficios para la salud pública .

Causas

Si no existen normas sobre la cantidad de peces que pueden capturar los pescadores, la pesca puede provocar el agotamiento de los recursos.

Las externalidades suelen surgir de derechos de propiedad mal definidos . [Todo el contenido de esta sección es sumamente controvertido y ofrece una visión parcial, sesgada, poco documentada e ideológicamente sesgada de las externalidades y del concepto de derechos de propiedad. Esta sección debe ser revisada y sometida a revisión por pares, ya que su contenido actual es altamente tendencioso, exaltando una comprensión libertaria simplista de los derechos de propiedad y truncando las ideas de Coas sobre supuestas verdades universales. Toda la sección es altamente política e indistinguible de la propaganda o la defensa ideológica de una visión muy limitada de las externalidades y los derechos de propiedad, lo cual resultaría sumamente problemático si se presentara a cualquier revista académica de economía o economía política con un nivel de revisión adecuado.]

Si bien los derechos de propiedad sobre ciertos bienes, como objetos, tierras y dinero, pueden definirse y protegerse fácilmente, el aire, el agua y los animales salvajes suelen circular libremente a través de fronteras personales y políticas, lo que dificulta enormemente la asignación de la propiedad. Esto incentiva a los agentes a consumirlos sin pagar el precio completo, lo que genera externalidades negativas. De igual modo, las externalidades positivas se derivan de derechos de propiedad mal definidos. Por ejemplo, una persona que se vacuna contra la gripe no puede ser propietaria de una parte de la inmunidad colectiva que esta confiere a la sociedad, por lo que puede optar por no vacunarse.

When resources are managed poorly or there are no well-defined property rights, externalities frequently result, especially when it comes to common pool resources. Due to their rivalrous usage and non-excludability, common pool resources including fisheries, forests, and grazing areas are vulnerable to abuse and deterioration when access is unrestrained. Without clearly defined property rights or efficient management structures, people or organizations may misuse common pool resources without thinking through the long-term effects, which might have detrimental externalities on other users and society at large. This phenomenon—famously referred to by Garrett Hardin as the "tragedy of the commons"—highlights people's propensity to put their immediate self-interests ahead of the sustainability of shared resources.[52]

Imagine, for instance, that there are no rules or limits in place and that several fishers have access to a single fishing area. In order to maintain their way of life and earn income, fishers are motivated to maximize their catches, which eventually causes overfishing and the depletion of fish populations. Fish populations decrease, and as a result, ecosystems are irritated, and the fishing industry experiences financial losses. These consequences have an adverse effect on subsequent generations and other people who depend on the resource. Nevertheless, the reduction of externalities linked to resources in common pools frequently necessitates the adoption of collaborative management approaches, like community-based management frameworks, tradable permits, and quotas. Communities can lessen the tragedy of the commons and encourage sustainable resource use and conservation for the benefit of current and future generations by establishing property rights or controlling access to shared resources.[52]

Another common cause of externalities is the presence of transaction costs.[53] Transaction costs are the cost of making an economic trade. These costs prevent economic agents from making exchanges they should be making. The costs of the transaction outweigh the benefit to the agent. When not all mutually beneficial exchanges occur in a market, that market is inefficient. Without transaction costs, agents could freely negotiate and internalize all externalities.

In order to further understand transactional costs, it is crucial to discuss Ronald Coase's methodologies. The standard theory of externalities, which holds that internalizing external costs or benefits requires government action through measures like Pigovian taxes or regulations, has been challenged by Coase. He presents the idea of transaction costs, which include the expenses related to reaching, upholding, and keeping an eye on agreements between parties. In the existence of externalities, transaction costs may hinder the effectiveness of private bargaining and result in worse-than-ideal results, according to Coase. He does, however, contend that private parties can establish mutually advantageous arrangements to internalize externalities without the involvement of the government, provided that there are minimal transaction costs and clearly defined property rights. Nevertheless, Coase uses the example of the distribution of property rights between a farmer and a rancher to support his claims. Assume there is a negative externality because the farmer's crops are harmed by the rancher's livestock. In a society where property rights are well-defined and transaction costs are minimal, the farmer and rancher can work out a voluntary agreement to settle the dispute. For example, the farmer may invest in preventive measures to lessen the impact, or the rancher could pay the farmer back for the harm the cattle caused. Coase's approach emphasizes how crucial it is to take property rights and transaction costs into account when managing externalities. He highlights that voluntary transactions between private parties can allow private parties to internalise externalities and that property rights distribution and transaction cost reduction can help make this possible.[54]

Possible solutions

Solutions in non-market economies

  • In planned economies, production is typically limited only to necessity, which would eliminate externalities created by overproduction.
  • The central planner can decide to create and allocate jobs in industries that work to mitigate externalities, rather than waiting for the market to create a demand for these jobs.

Solutions in market economies

Regulations against actions with negative externalities, like "No Dumping" laws, can reduce these actions.

There are several general types of solutions to the problem of externalities, including both public- and private-sector resolutions:

Un impuesto pigouviano (también llamado impuesto pigouviano, en honor al economista Arthur C. Pigou) es un impuesto cuyo valor es igual a la externalidad negativa. Para corregir completamente la externalidad negativa, el impuesto por unidad debe ser igual al costo externo marginal. [ 56 ] El resultado es que el resultado del mercado se reduce a la cantidad eficiente. Un efecto secundario es que se generan ingresos para el gobierno, lo que reduce la cantidad de impuestos distorsionadores que este debe imponer en otros ámbitos. Los gobiernos justifican el uso de los impuestos pigouvianos argumentando que estos impuestos ayudan al mercado a alcanzar un resultado eficiente porque cubren la brecha entre los costos sociales marginales y los costos privados marginales. [ 57 ]

Algunos argumentos en contra de los impuestos pigouvianos señalan que el impuesto no considera todas las transferencias y regulaciones relacionadas con una externalidad. En otras palabras, el impuesto solo considera la cantidad de externalidad producida. [ 58 ] Otro argumento en contra del impuesto es que no toma en consideración la propiedad privada. Bajo el sistema pigouviano, una empresa, por ejemplo, puede ser gravada más que otra, incluso si esta última produce mayores cantidades de la externalidad negativa. [ 59 ]

Further arguments against Pigou disagree with his assumption every externality has someone at fault or responsible for the damages.[60] Coase argues that externalities are reciprocal in nature. Both parties must be present for an externality to exist. He uses the example of two neighbors. One neighbor possesses a fireplace, and often lights fires in his house without issue. Then one day, the other neighbor builds a wall that prevents the smoke from escaping and sends it back into the fire-building neighbor's home. This illustrates the reciprocal nature of externalities. Without the wall, the smoke would not be a problem, but without the fire, the smoke would not exist to cause problems in the first place. Coase also takes issue with Pigou's assumption of a "benevolent despot" government. Pigou assumes the government's role is to see the external costs or benefits of a transaction and assign an appropriate tax or subsidy. Coase argues that the government faces costs and benefits just like any other economic agent, so other factors play into its decision-making.

However, the most common type of solution is a tacit agreement through the political process. Governments are elected to represent citizens and to strike political compromises between various interests. Normally governments pass laws and regulations to address pollution and other types of environmental harm. These laws and regulations can take the form of "command and control" regulation (such as enforcing standards and limiting process variables), or environmental pricing reform (such as ecotaxes or other Pigovian taxes, tradable pollution permits or the creation of markets for ecological services). The second type of resolution is a purely private agreement between the parties involved.

Government intervention might not always be needed. Traditional ways of life may have evolved as ways to deal with external costs and benefits. Alternatively, democratically run communities can agree to deal with these costs and benefits in an amicable way. Externalities can sometimes be resolved by agreement between the parties involved. This resolution may even come about because of the threat of government action.

The use of taxes and subsidies in solving the problem of externalities Correction tax, respectively subsidy, means essentially any mechanism that increases, respectively decreases, the costs (and thus price) associated with the activities of an individual or company.[61]

The private-sector may sometimes be able to drive society to the socially optimal resolution. Ronald Coase argued that an efficient outcome can sometimes be reached without government intervention. Some take this argument further, and make the political argument that government should restrict its role to facilitating bargaining among the affected groups or individuals and to enforcing any contracts that result.

This result, often known as the Coase theorem, requires that

If all of these conditions apply, the private parties can bargain to solve the problem of externalities. The second part of the Coase theorem asserts that, when these conditions hold, whoever holds the property rights, a Pareto efficient outcome will be reached through bargaining.

This theorem would not apply to the steel industry case discussed above. For example, with a steel factory that trespasses on the lungs of a large number of individuals with pollution, it is difficult if not impossible for any one person to negotiate with the producer, and there are large transaction costs. Hence the most common approach may be to regulate the firm (by imposing limits on the amount of pollution considered "acceptable") while paying for the regulation and enforcement with taxes. The case of the vaccinations would also not satisfy the requirements of the Coase theorem. Since the potential external beneficiaries of vaccination are the people themselves, the people would have to self-organize to pay each other to be vaccinated. But such an organization that involves the entire populace would be indistinguishable from government action.

In some cases, the Coase theorem is relevant. For example, if a logger is planning to clear-cut a forest in a way that has a negative impact on a nearby resort, the resort-owner and the logger could, in theory, get together to agree to a deal. For example, the resort-owner could pay the logger not to clear-cut – or could buy the forest. The most problematic situation, from Coase's perspective, occurs when the forest literally does not belong to anyone, or in any example in which there are not well-defined and enforceable property rights; the question of "who" owns the forest is not important, as any specific owner will have an interest in coming to an agreement with the resort owner (if such an agreement is mutually beneficial).

Sin embargo, el teorema de Coase es difícil de implementar porque no ofrece un método de negociación. [ 62 ] Además, es improbable que se alcancen soluciones coasiáticas debido a la posibilidad de encontrarse con el problema de asignación , el problema de retención , el problema del polizón o los costos de transacción . Adicionalmente, las empresas podrían sobornarse entre sí, ya que hay poca o ninguna interacción gubernamental bajo el teorema de Coase. [ 63 ] Por ejemplo, si una empresa petrolera tiene una alta tasa de contaminación y su empresa vecina está molesta por la contaminación, entonces esta última empresa podría actuar según los incentivos. Por lo tanto, si la empresa petrolera sobornara a la segunda empresa, la primera empresa petrolera no sufriría consecuencias negativas porque el gobierno no se enteraría del soborno.

En un contexto dinámico, Rosenkranz y Schmitz (2007) demostraron que la imposibilidad de descartar la negociación coaseana en el futuro podría justificar la intervención pigouviana en la actualidad. [ 64 ] Para comprender esto, cabe señalar que la negociación sin restricciones en el futuro podría conducir a un problema de subinversión (el llamado problema de retención ). Específicamente, cuando las inversiones son específicas de la relación y no contractuales, se realizarán inversiones insuficientes si se prevé que parte de los rendimientos de las inversiones se destinarán al socio comercial en futuras negociaciones (véase Hart y Moore, 1988). [ 65 ] Por lo tanto, la tributación pigouviana puede mejorar el bienestar precisamente porque la negociación coaseana tendrá lugar en el futuro. Antràs y Staiger (2012) plantean una idea similar en el contexto del comercio internacional. [ 66 ]

Kenneth Arrow propone otra solución privada al problema de las externalidades. [ 67 ] Considera que la solución reside en establecer un mercado para dichas externalidades. Por ejemplo, supongamos que una empresa produce contaminación que perjudica a otra. Un mercado competitivo para el derecho a contaminar podría propiciar un resultado eficiente. Las empresas podrían ofrecer el precio que están dispuestas a pagar por la cantidad que desean contaminar y, a su vez, tener el derecho a contaminar dicha cantidad sin penalización. Esto permitiría a las empresas contaminar en la cantidad en la que el coste marginal de contaminar sea igual al beneficio marginal de otra unidad de contaminación, lo que conduciría a la eficiencia.

Frank Knight also argued against government intervention as the solution to externalities.[68] He proposed that externalities could be internalized with privatization of the relevant markets. He uses the example of road congestion to make his point. Congestion could be solved through the taxation of public roads. Knight shows that government intervention is unnecessary if roads were privately owned instead. If roads were privately owned, their owners could set tolls that would reduce traffic and thus congestion to an efficient level. This argument forms the basis of the traffic equilibrium. This argument supposes that two points are connected by two different highways. One highway is in poor condition, but is wide enough to fit all traffic that desires to use it. The other is a much better road, but has limited capacity. Knight argues that, if a large number of vehicles operate between the two destinations and have freedom to choose between the routes, they will distribute themselves in proportions such that the cost per unit of transportation will be the same for every truck on both highways. This is true because as more trucks use the narrow road, congestion develops and as congestion increases it becomes equally profitable to use the poorer highway. This solves the externality issue without requiring any government tax or regulations.

Solutions to greenhouse gas emission externalities

The negative effect of carbon emissions and other greenhouse gases produced in production exacerbate the numerous environmental and human impacts of anthropogenic climate change. These negative effects are not reflected in the cost of producing, nor in the market price of the final goods. There are many public and private solutions proposed to combat this externality

Emissions fee

An emissions fee, or carbon tax, is a tax levied on each unit of pollution produced in the production of a good or service. The tax incentivised producers to either lower their production levels or to undertake abatement activities that reduce emissions by switching to cleaner technology or inputs.[69]

Cap-and-trade systems

El sistema de límites máximos y comercio de emisiones permite alcanzar el nivel de contaminación eficiente (determinado por el gobierno) mediante el establecimiento de una cantidad total de emisiones y la emisión de permisos negociables a las empresas contaminantes, lo que les permite contaminar una cierta proporción del nivel permitido. Los permisos se intercambiarán entre empresas con bajos costos de reducción de emisiones y empresas con mayores costos de reducción de emisiones, por lo que el sistema es rentable y eficiente en términos de costos. El sistema de límites máximos y comercio de emisiones tiene algunas ventajas prácticas sobre una tasa de emisiones, tales como: 1. Reduce la incertidumbre sobre el nivel final de contaminación. 2. Si las empresas buscan maximizar sus ganancias, utilizarán tecnología que minimice los costos para alcanzar el estándar, lo cual es eficiente para cada empresa y proporciona incentivos al mercado de investigación y desarrollo para innovar. 3. El precio de mercado de los derechos de contaminación se mantendría al ritmo del nivel de precios mientras la economía experimenta inflación.

Los sistemas de tasas por emisiones y de límites máximos y comercio de emisiones son enfoques basados ​​en incentivos para resolver un problema de externalidades negativas.

Reglamentos de mando y control

Las regulaciones de mando y control actúan como alternativa al enfoque basado en incentivos. Requieren una cantidad determinada de reducción de la contaminación y pueden adoptar la forma de un estándar tecnológico o un estándar de desempeño. Un estándar tecnológico exige que las empresas contaminantes utilicen una tecnología específica. Si bien puede reducir la contaminación, no es rentable y frena la innovación al incentivar la investigación y el desarrollo de tecnologías que funcionarían mejor que la obligatoria. Los estándares de desempeño establecen objetivos de emisiones para cada empresa contaminante. La libertad de elección de la empresa para determinar cómo alcanzar el nivel de emisiones deseado hace que esta opción sea ligeramente más eficiente que el estándar tecnológico; sin embargo, no es tan rentable como el sistema de límites máximos y comercio de emisiones, ya que la carga de la reducción de emisiones no se puede transferir a las empresas con menor reducción. [ 70 ]

Cálculo científico de los costes externos

"El precio porcentual relativo [∆] aumenta para categorías amplias [...] cuando las externalidades de las emisiones de gases de efecto invernadero se incluyen en el precio del productor." [ 71 ]

A 2020 scientific analysis of external climate costs of foods indicates that external greenhouse gas costs are typically highest for animal-based products – conventional and organic to about the same extent within that ecosystem-subdomain – followed by conventional dairy products and lowest for organicplant-based foods and concludes that contemporary monetary evaluations are "inadequate" and that policy-making that lead to reductions of these costs to be possible, appropriate and urgent.[72][73][71]

Criticism

Ecological economics criticizes the concept of externality because there is not enough system thinking and integration of different sciences in the concept. Ecological economics is founded upon the view that the neoclassical economics (NCE) assumption that environmental and community costs and benefits are mutually cancelling "externalities" is not warranted. Joan Martinez Alier,[74] for instance shows that the bulk of consumers are automatically excluded from having an impact upon the prices of commodities, as these consumers are future generations who have not been born yet. The assumptions behind future discounting, which assume that future goods will be cheaper than present goods, has been criticized by Fred Pearce[75] and by the Stern Report (although the Stern report itself does employ discounting and has been criticized for this and other reasons by ecological economists such as Clive Spash).[76]

Concerning these externalities, some, like the eco-businessman Paul Hawken, argue an orthodox economic line that the only reason why goods produced unsustainably are usually cheaper than goods produced sustainably is due to a hidden subsidy, paid by the non-monetized human environment, community or future generations.[77] These arguments are developed further by Hawken, Amory and Hunter Lovins to promote their vision of an environmental capitalist utopia in Natural Capitalism: Creating the Next Industrial Revolution.[78]

En contraste, los economistas ecológicos, como Joan Martinez-Alier, recurren a una línea de razonamiento diferente. [ 79 ] En lugar de asumir que alguna (nueva) forma de capitalismo es el mejor camino a seguir, una crítica económica ecológica más antigua cuestiona la idea misma de internalizar las externalidades como una corrección al sistema actual. El trabajo de Karl William Kapp [ 80 ] argumenta que el concepto de "externalidad" es un término inapropiado. [ 81 ] De hecho, la empresa moderna opera sobre la base de transferir costos a otros como práctica normal para obtener ganancias. [ 82 ] Charles Eisenstein ha argumentado que este método de privatizar las ganancias mientras se socializan los costos a través de externalidades, transfiriendo los costos a la comunidad, al medio ambiente natural o a las generaciones futuras es inherentemente destructivo. [ 83 ] El economista socioecológico Clive Spash argumenta que la teoría de las externalidades asume erróneamente que los problemas ambientales y sociales son aberraciones menores en un sistema económico eficiente que, por lo demás, funciona perfectamente. [ 84 ] Internalizar la externalidad extraña no resuelve el problema sistémico estructural y no reconoce la naturaleza omnipresente de estas supuestas «externalidades». Precisamente por eso, los economistas heterodoxos abogan por una teoría heterodoxa de los costos sociales para prevenir eficazmente el problema mediante el principio de precaución. [ 85 ]

Véase también

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Lecturas adicionales

  • Anderson, David A. (2019). Economía ambiental y gestión de recursos naturales (5.ª  ed.). Nueva York: Routledge. ISBN 978-0-8153-5903-6.
  • Berger, Sebastian (2017). Los costos sociales del neoliberalismo: Ensayos sobre la economía de K. William Kapp . Nottingham: Spokesman. ISBN 978-0-85124-864-6.
  • Berger, Sebastian (2015). Sebastian Berger (ed.). La teoría heterodoxa de los costos sociales – por K. William Kapp . Londres: Routledge. ISBN 978-1-138-77547-3.
  • Baumol, WJ (1972). "Sobre la tributación y el control de las externalidades". American Economic Review . 62 (3): 307– 22. JSTOR 1803378 . 
  • Johnson, Paul M. "Externalidad" . Glosario de términos de economía política . Universidad de Auburn . Consultado el 21 de julio de 2025 .
  • Pigou, AC (1920). Economía del bienestar . Macmillan and Co.
  • Tullock, G. (2005). Bienes públicos, redistribución y búsqueda de rentas . Edward Elgar Publishing, Inc. ISBN 978-1-84376-637-7.
  • Volokh, Alexander (2008). «Externalidades» . En Hamowy, Ronald (ed.). La enciclopedia del libertarismo . Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE ; Cato Institute . pp. 162–63 . doi : 10.4135/9781412965811.n101 . ISBN  978-1-4129-6580-4LCCN 2008009151 . OCLC 750831024 .​  
  • Weitzman, Martin (octubre de 1974). "Precios vs. Cantidades". The Review of Economic Studies . 41 (4): 477– 91. doi : 10.2307/2296698 . JSTOR 2296698. S2CID 153209646 .  
  • Laffont, Jean-Jacques (2008). «Externalidades» . En Blume, Lawrence E.; Durlauf, Steven N. (eds.). The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics (2.ª  ed.). Londres: Palgrave Macmillan . Consultado el 21 de julio de 2025 .
  • ExternE – Proyecto de la Unión Europea para evaluar los costes externos
  • Economía 120 – Externalidades