SMBRelay and SMBRelay2 are computer programs that can be used to carry out SMBman-in-the-middle (mitm) attacks on Windows machines. They were written by Sir Dystic of Cult of the Dead Cow (cDc) and released March 21, 2001 at the @lantacon convention in Atlanta, Georgia. More than seven years after its release, Microsoft released a patch that fixed the hole exploited by SMBRelay.[1][2] This fix only fixes the vulnerability when the SMB is reflected back to the client. If it is forwarded to another host, the vulnerability can be still exploited.[3][4]
SMBRelay
SMBrelay receives a connection on UDPport 139 and relays the packets between the client and server of the connecting Windows machine to the originating computer's port 139. It modifies these packets when necessary.
After connecting and authenticating, the target's client is disconnected and SMBRelay binds to port 139 on a new IP address. This relay address can then be connected to directly using "net use \\192.1.1.1" and then used by all of the networking functions built into Windows. The program relays all of the SMB traffic, excluding negotiation and authentication. As long as the target host remains connected, the user can disconnect from and reconnect to this virtual IP.
SMBRelay collects the NTLM password hashes and writes them to hashes.txt in a format usable by L0phtCrack for cracking at a later time.
As port 139 is a privileged port and requires administrator access for use, SMBRelay must run as an administrator access account. However, since port 139 is needed for NetBIOS sessions, it is difficult to block.
According to Sir Dystic, "The problem is that from a marketing standpoint, Microsoft wants their products to have as much backward compatibility as possible; but by continuing to use protocols that have known issues, they continue to leave their customers at risk to exploitation... These are, yet again, known issues that have existed since day one of this protocol. This is not a bug but a fundamental design flaw. To assume that nobody has used this method to exploit people is silly; it took me less than two weeks to write SMBRelay."[5]
SMBRelay2
SMBRelay2 funciona a nivel de NetBIOS en cualquier protocolo al que esté vinculado NetBIOS (como NBF o NBT ). Se diferencia de SMBrelay en que utiliza nombres NetBIOS en lugar de direcciones IP.
SMBRelay2 también admite ataques de intermediario (man-in-the-middle) a un tercer host. Sin embargo, solo admite la escucha en un nombre a la vez.
Véase también
Referencias
- ↑ " Boletín de seguridad de Microsoft MS08-068 ". Boletín de seguridad de Microsoft, 11 de noviembre de 2008. Consultado el 12 de noviembre de 2008.
- ↑ Fontana, John. " Un parche de Microsoft cierra una vulnerabilidad del sistema operativo de siete años de antigüedad, según un experto. Archivado el 2 de abril de 2012 en Wayback Machine ". Network World , 12 de noviembre de 2008. Consultado el 12 de noviembre de 2008.
- ↑ " NTLM está muerto" (PDF) . Archivado del original (PDF) el 18 de octubre de 2012.", Kurt Grutzmacher - Defcon 16
- ↑ " "Errores de seguridad en los protocolos" (PDF) . 2010. Archivado del original (PDF) el 26-11-2011 . Recuperado el 26-01-2012 ."¡Los fallos de seguridad en los protocolos son realmente graves!"
- ↑ Greene, Thomas C. " Una vulnerabilidad de seguridad desestabiliza WinNT/2K ". Edición en línea de The Register , 19 de abril de 2001. Consultado el 20 de agosto de 2005.
Enlaces externos
- El ataque Man-In-the-Middle de SMB fue archivado el 29 de agosto de 2005 en Wayback Machine por Sir Dystic.
- Boletín de seguridad de Symantec
- Cómo deshabilitar la autenticación LM en Windows NT : lista de sistemas operativos afectados
- Tu guía práctica para diseñar seguridad en protocolos de red
- Protección extendida para la autenticación
- Software de seguridad de Windows
- vulnerabilidades de seguridad informática
- Software de red basado en el protocolo de Internet
- Software Culto a la Vaca Muerta