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Methodological dualism

In praxeology , methodological dualism is an epistemological position which states that it is necessary ─ based on our current state of knowledge and understanding ─ to use a di...

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In praxeology, methodological dualism is an epistemological position which states that it is necessary ─ based on our current state of knowledge and understanding ─ to use a different method in analysing the actions of human beings than the methods of the natural sciences (such as physics, chemistry, physiology, etc.).[1]

This position is based on the presupposition that humans differ radically from other objects in the external world. Namely, humans purposefully aim at chosen ends and employ chosen means to attain them (i.e. humans act), whereas other objects in nature ─ such as, for example, sticks, stones, and atoms ─ do not.[2]

Methodological dualism is not a metaphysical or ontological doctrine, and refrains from making such judgments.[3]

Overview

Ludwig von Mises' insistence on methodological dualism was a reaction against “the ‘methodological monism’ preached by behaviorists and positivists who [saw] no basic reason to approach human behavior and social phenomena differently from the way natural scientists approach molecular behavior and physical phenomena.”[4]

Mises states that the sciences of human action deal with ends and means, with volition, with meaning and understanding, with “thoughts, ideas, and judgments of value”. Action is the purposive use of chosen means for the attainment of chosen ends, and ideas, beliefs, and judgments of value (called mental phenomena) determine the choice of both means and ends.[5] Thus, these mental phenomena occupy a central position in the sciences of human action for, as Mises argues, “acts of choosing are determined by thoughts and ideas.”[6]

In arguing for methodological dualism, Mises states because the natural sciences have not yet determined “how definite external events […] produce within the human mind definite ideas, value judgments, and volitions”,[7] this ignorance splits our knowledge into two distinct fields, the “realm of external events” on the one hand, and the “realm of human thought and action” on the other.

Así, la concepción de Mises sobre las ciencias de la acción humana —es decir, la praxeología y la timología— se basa en este dualismo metodológico. Mises argumenta que, al ser nosotros mismos seres pensantes y actuantes, podemos reflexionar, mediante la introspección, [ 8 ] sobre el significado de la acción, de la intención y la voluntad, de los fines y los medios, y sobre nuestras ideas, creencias y juicios de valor. Este tipo de conocimiento reflexivo , insiste Mises, es conocimiento interno, «es nuestro porque somos hombres», [ 9 ] mientras que no somos piedras ni átomos y, por lo tanto, no podemos reflexionar sobre lo que significa ser estas cosas.

Véase también

Referencias

  1. ↑ Mises. (1957). Teoría e historia , pág. 1.
  2. ↑ ídem , pág. xiii.
  3. ↑ ídem , pág. 1.
  4. ↑ White, L. (2003). La metodología de los economistas de la escuela austriaca , pág. 17.
  5. ↑ Mises. (2008). La acción humana: Un tratado de economía , pp. 11-3.
  6. ↑ Teoría e historia , pág. 11.
  7. ↑ Mises. (1962). El fundamento último de la ciencia económica , pág. 83.
  8. ↑ Teoría e historia , págs. 283-4.
  9. ↑ Acción humana , pág. 64.